The instability of banks during the recent financial crisis underlines the importance of understanding how banks determine their capital ratios. This paper conducts the first empirical assessment on how banks adjust their capital ratios following an exogenous shock to their asset risks. The existing literature, which uses non-experimental identification, faces the difficulty that banks typically determine capital ratios and asset risks simultaneously. Using Hurricane Katrina as a natural experiment, we find that banks in the disaster areas increase their risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane. This finding shows that banks act precautious by themselves irrespective of regulatory requirements. However, when we examine low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks separately, we find that results are driven by high-capitalized banks. In addition, high-capitalized banks increase their risk-based capital ratios by decreasing loans and not by increasing capital.
Introduction
The U.S. financial crisis demonstrates that the stability of the banking system is essential to economic welfare. In particular, the crisis caused unstable banks to cut lending and to increase loan spreads (e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Puri et al., 2010; Santos, 2011) , which led to a decline in corporate investments (e.g., Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010) . Because the deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to become excessively risky, banking regulation is generally a necessity. Regulation builds on the idea that minimum capital ratios mitigate distortions from inefficiently priced deposit insurance and thus reduces banks' moral hazard. With sufficient equity "at stake", banks should have less incentives to take excessive risks and thus should be more stable. The traditional view is that capital requirements are binding for banks, because banks try to economize on costly capital. However, empirical evidence shows that banks hold levels of capital well above the regulatory minimum (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2008 ). An important question resulting from the financial crisis is whether "banks choose the right capital structure, left to themselves, or . . . does the government have to force them to raise more capital" (Gale, 2010) . In summary, bank capital ratios are the cornerstone of banking policy and regulation, but the determination of these ratios is not well understood. This paper tests the hypothesis that an exogenous adverse shock to banks' assets, which initially increases their asset and bankruptcy risks, causes banks to choose a new optimal capital ratio. A positive relation suggests that banks wish to mitigate bankruptcy risks. A negative relation points towards incentives for banks to exploit the deposit insurance. No significant relation indicates that risk does not affect a bank's capital-ratio decisions outside regulatory requirements.
In order to identify causality between a bank's asset risk and its capital ratio, we use Hurricane Katrina as a natural experiment. Hurricane Katrina caused estimated damages to property in excess of $200 billion and ranks among the costliest natural disasters in United States history (Congleton, 2006) . Consequently, Katrina exposed banks in the U.S. Gulf Coast region to unexpected losses and increased their asset risks in August 2005 because a large part of the potential damages for borrowers was not insured. Importantly, the hurricane caused uncertainty for banks on how commercial and individual borrowers could cope with the damages. In particular, asymmetric information between banks and their borrowers increased, and it was also uncertain how the overall economy in the affected areas would recover from the shock. Fig. 1(a) illustrates loan loss provisions over loans for independent banks located in areas that the hurricane affected (affected banks) and for banks located in areas unaffected (unaffected banks). 1 While affected and unaffected banks follow similar trajectories before the hurricane, it is clear that loan loss provisions over loans increased sharply for affected banks in Q4 2005. The FDIC (2006) characterized the situation as follows:
Hurricane Katrina had a devastating effect on the U.S. Gulf Coast region that will continue to affect the business activities of the financial institutions serving this area for the foreseeable future. Some of these institutions may face significant loan quality issues caused by business failures, interruptions of borrowers' income streams, increases in borrowers' operating costs, the loss of jobs, and uninsured or underinsured collateral damage.
Along the same lines, the major rating agencies announced close monitoring of capital adequacy and the risk-management processes of affected banks in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Moody's, 2005; Guy Carpenter, 2006) . Furthermore, Hurricane Katrina changed the (perceived) hurricane risks, as reflected in the increases of 30% or more for property insurance premiums (USA TODAY, 2010).
[ Fig. 1] For the estimation of the effect of an exogenous increase in the riskiness of banks' asset risks on the total risk-based capital, we employ a difference-in-difference estimation technique. All independent affected banks in the U.S. Gulf Coast region comprise our treatment group, and all independent unaffected banks in the U.S. Gulf Coast region comprise our control group. The observation that affected banks on average increase their risk-based capital ratios 1 Our classification into affected banks and unaffected banks builds on hurricane data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The analysis focuses on independent banks and leaves out banks that are part of a bank-holding company. Details are provided in Section 2.
provides the first indication on how banks reacted to the increased asset risks relative to the control group after the hurricane, shown in Fig. 2. [ Fig. 2] The key findings of our analysis are as follows: A shock that increases banks' asset risks induces the affected banks to increase their risk-based capital ratios after the event relative to the banks in the control group (unaffected by the shock). This increase shows that asset risk is an important determinant of banks' capital ratios outside of any regulatory requirements. Affected banks presumably reestablish their bank-specific cushion against insolvency and choose a capital ratio that corresponds to their risk-return profile before the hurricane.
Furthermore, when we examine low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks separately, we find that the precautionary behavior only holds for high-capitalized banks. 2 A potential explanation from the literature is that banks with high franchise values and/or high bankruptcy costs have incentives to avoid bankruptcy, and are thus characterized by high-capital ratios (before a hurricane) and precautionary measures (after a hurricane). Further, our analysis shows that high-capitalized banks react to the higher asset risks by shifting investments from risky loans to risk-free U.S. government securities, and thereby increase their capital ratios.
We do not find a significant effect for changes in leverage.
We add to the literature by establishing a causal effect of asset risks on capital ratios. This causal effect is difficult to examine because asset risk and capital ratios are typically determined simultaneously by banks. Moreover, it is difficult to measure asset risk. For example, risk weighted assets only partially capture the risk a bank carries, and the standard deviation of asset returns reflects past but not future risk. In our study, the difficulty of establishing a causal effect and the difficulty of measuring asset risk is circumvented by using an exogenous shock. Previous studies do not use exogenous variation to identify a relation and to measure asset risk. Using simultaneous equations, two-stage, or standard OLS estimation techniques, these studies typically find a positive relation between risk and capital ratios (e.g., Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010) . 3 Our findings are in 2 We define all banks with an average capital ratio before the hurricane below the median of 15.8% as "low-capitalized" and all other banks as "high-capitalized".
3 Further, the main message from Gropp and Heider (2010) is that capital regulations are of second-order line with findings from these studies and add further evidence on the causal relation between asset risk and capital ratios.
This paper also adds to the growing literature that explores the real effects of substantial adverse credit shocks. Puri et al. (2010) find that the U.S. crisis led to a contraction in banks' retail lending in Germany, which they attributed to the supply side. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that banks are less likely to cut down on lending if sufficient refinancing from deposits is available such that they do not need to rely on short-term debt. Using the landprice collapse in Japan in the early 1990s, Gan (2007) reports that firms with greater collateral losses get less credit and reduce investments. Our paper presents complementary evidence that high-capitalized banks cut their loans and substitute them with risk-free government securities. Our results that banks do not significantly adjust their leverage ratios shows the relative "stickiness" of equity capital as discussed by Adrian and Shin (2011) .
More generally, this paper adds to the literature on the determinants of banks' risk taking and the related impact of bank regulation. Kim and Santomero (1988) and Furlong and Keeley (1989) consider how capital requirements affect banks' risk taking. On the one hand, higher capital requirements reduce incentives for banks to increase asset risk. On the other hand, there is a contrary effect for banks to invest in riskier projects as a consequence of the restricted risk-return profile. Hellmann et al. (2000) study the combined effect of financial liberalization and capital regulation on banks' risk taking. Diamond and Rajan (2000) show that bank capital reduces the probability of financial distress in times of crisis. They analyze how capital as a buffer against shocks affects banks' liquidity creation. Marcus (1984) shows that when charter values are high, exploiting the deposit insurance is not optimal for banks.
Along these lines, Keeley (1990) analyzes how increased competition triggers a decline in banks' charter values and causes banks to become more risky. Laeven and Levine (2009) analyze how bank regulation affects risk taking and show that it depends on bank governance. Allen et al. (2011) analyze the role of credit-market competition in capital regulation and find that market discipline can be induced from the asset side.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains the data and summary statistics. Section 3 importance and time-invariant bank fixed effects are the most important determinant of banks' capital structures.
presents our identification strategy and empirical model. Section 4 shows the main estimation results. Section 5 explores the differences between high-capitalized and low-capitalized banks.
Section 6 further investigates mechanisms through which affected banks change their total risk-based capital ratios. Section 7 concludes. All figures and tables appear in the appendix.
Data and summary statistics
We start by describing the data sources and sample selection for our study. Next, we discuss how we measure bank asset risks, our main explanatory variable, and bank capital ratios, which is the main dependent variable. Further, we provide summary statistics for our sample.
Data sources and sample description
Our data come from three public sources. As regards the impact of Hurricane Katrina 4 on the U.S. Gulf Coast region, we use data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FEMA is a U.S. agency established in 1979 with "the mission of helping communities nationwide prepare for, respond to and recover from natural and man-made disasters" (FEMA, 2008) . Further, we use the FDIC database that provides "Reports of Income and Condition" (Call Reports) that comprises detailed quarterly financial and regulatory bank data for all commercial and domestic banks in the U.S. The data refer to individual FDICinsured institutions, and the FDIC does not consolidate the data into banking groups. Also, we use quarterly unemployment data at the county level from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to examine the robustness of our results with regard to time-varying macroeconomic conditions.
Our sample includes all independent banks (i.e., banks that are not part of a bank holding company) in the Gulf Coast region and neighbor states, that is, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Florida, Alabama, Oklahoma, Georgia, Arkansas and Tennessee. We focus on independent banks and exclude all banks that are part of a bank-holding company ("BHC banks") for two reasons. 5 First, these banks typically operate regionally and are therefore likely to be affected by an exogenous shock that hits their region. Second, we want to exclude distortive effects from internal capital markets within bank-holding groups that are due to capital allocations or implicit and explicit guarantees (Houston et al., 1997; Froot and Stein, 1998 Previous studies that have also used the FDIC data set find that some of the data is erroneous or includes banks that are "not viable". Therefore, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) and exclude banks that (1) have no commercial real estate or commercial and industry loans outstanding, (2) have zero or negative equity capital, (3) hold assets below $25 million or (4) hold consumer loans exceeding 50% of gross total assets. 6 Further, we leave out banks with very high total risk-based capital ratios above 40%, which represents five times the regulatory requirement of 8%. We also exclude biases from newly founded banks. Therefore, we require that banks be in existence for at least two years before the event took place. Naturally, we also exclude all banks that were established after the hurricane took place. The final data set includes 287 banks of which we classify 99 as affected and 178 as unaffected by the hurricane.
5 Technically, we require that the FDIC data field that denotes a bank-holding company is left blank. 6 Some further exclusion criteria used by Berger and Bouwman (2009) are not relevant to our sample.
Bank asset risks
Our main explanatory variable for bank capital ratios is bank asset risk. Measures for bank asset risks that are frequently used in the literature are the change in risk-weighted assets (e.g., Avery and Berger, 1991) , the standard deviation of the return over assets (e.g., Laeven
and Levine, 2009, calculate a bank z-score) or the standard deviation of (unlevered) stock price returns (e.g., Gropp and Heider, 2010; Flannery and Rangan, 2008) . In our study, we depart from using these traditional measures because they cause endogeneity concerns. Fig. 3 ). Last, we exclude banks from the sample if their headquarters are located in counties eligible for public disaster assistance but not eligible for individual disaster assistance, because this criterion is ambiguous. The sample includes counties that are both somehow affected and very distant from the wind fields, for example, counties in the northwest Texas region that possibly were designated for public assistance for political reasons. To guarantee that we are dealing with banks that were clearly affected or clearly not affected by the hurricane, we exclude banks from these counties. Consequently,
we are left with a clean identification of banks located in affected counties and banks located in unaffected counties.
[ Fig. 3] 
Bank capital ratios
The main dependent variable that we use in our estimations is the total risk-based capital ratio as reported for each bank at the end of each quarter in the FDIC database. The sum of a bank's Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital divided by its risk-weighted assets represents its regulatory capital ratio. reports normalized differences to compare the similarity between both distributions for important bank characteristics. 9 As a rule of thumb, groups are regarded as sufficiently equal 7 For some banks, the denominator also includes Tier 3 capital allocated for market risk, net of all deductions. For details, see "Schedule RC-R -Regulatory Capital" of the FDIC.
Summary statistics and similarity between groups
8 The appendix in Table 12 provides a description of the FDIC data. 9 Normalized differences are calculated as "the difference in averages by treatment status, scaled by the square root of the sum of the variances" (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, p. 24) .
and adequate for linear regression methods if normalized differences are basically in the range of ± 0.25.
Overall, the summary statistics confirm that affected and unaffected banks are on average relatively similar. In particular, banks in both groups hold similar levels of total risk-based capital ratios of around 17.7% during the two years before the hurricane event. Note that this level substantially exceeds the regulatory minimum of 8%. This observation is in line with Flannery and Rangan (2008) who report high ratios for the U.S., and Barth et al. (2005) and Berger et al. (1995) who examine high cross-country ratios. We observe the same pattern for the tier capital-to-asset ratio where the mean value for banks' risk-weighted assets to assets is higher for the unaffected group but not significantly according to normalized differences of about ± 0.25. If we consider volumes of total risk-based capital, risk-weighted assets, and total assets, then we also do not find any significant differences. The same applies for loans and different loan types as well as for government securities, profitability, and risk measures for both groups. We also find that the share of commercial banks and banks that are classified as stock institutions are similar in counties that the hurricane affected and those that it did not. The same is true for the regional quarterly unemployment rate.
As regards external validity in our sample, we are also interested in the comparison between affected independent banks, which we include in our regressions, and affected nonindependent banks, bank-holding company (BHC) banks, which we exclude from our regressions. Therefore columns 5 and 6 of the table present the summary statistics for BHC banks. The statistics show that independent and BHC banks on average do not differ across a broad range of bank characteristics. The BHC banks tend to be larger and comprise only stock institutions, but the normalized differences are not outside the ± 0.25 range. Thus, our sample of independent banks is not significantly different from the sample of BHC banks.
[ Table 1 ]
Identification strategy and empirical model
To assess how the hurricane affects a bank's asset risk and consequently the bank's capital structure decision, this study considers potentially parallel macroeconomic and industry-wide factors that affect all banks independent of the shock. It would be misleading to simply test how affected banks adapt their total risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane. Another concern is that unobservable bank characteristics might influence the analysis. To account for both aspects, we use a difference-in-difference estimation technique with bank fixed effects.
Difference-in-difference identification
Ideally, a comparison of our observations on the capital ratios of a bank affected by Hurricane Katrina could be made with a bank's hypothetical capital ratio in case the bank had not been exposed to the hurricane. To do so, let DIS be a binary variable indicating whether bank i is affected (DIS = 1) or is not affected (DIS = 0) at time t. Let y 1 i,t+1 represent the value for the total risk-based capital ratio of an affected bank i in t + 1 after Hurricane Katrina at time t. The y 0 i,t+1 represents the hypothetical adaption of the total risk-based capital ratio of bank i in time t + 1 had the bank not gone through a hurricane. The effect of Katrina on the average total risk-based capital ratio for bank i, classified in the evaluation literature as the average treatment effect on the treated (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke, 2009), can be formally stated as:
(
The term E(y 1 i,t+1 |DIS = 1) represents the expected value for the total risk-based capital ratio of an affected bank i in t + 1 after Hurricane Katrina at time t. This term can be identified through the observed average effect on total risk-based capital for banks that were affected by Katrina. For this sample of affected banks, the term E(y 0 i,t+1 |DIS = 1) represents the counterfactual expected mean or hypothetical effect on the total risk-based capital ratio assuming these banks were initially not affected by the hurricane. This effect being unobservable needs to be approximated and represents the central problem of causal inference (Holland, 1986) .
In experimental studies, the identification problem is typically solved through random assignment for both groups, the treated and the control. When treatment is randomized across individuals, self-selection biases are excluded such that the mean independence assumption holds:
In our study we exploit exogenous variation from Hurricane Katrina. This natural disaster randomly selected banks into a treatment group (affected by Katrina) and a control group
(not affected by Katrina), such that E(y 0 i,t+1 |DIS = 1) can be identified by measuring the observed average effect on total risk-based capital ratios of the control group.
The comparison of both the treatment and control groups after the event could be misleading because trajectories of total risk-based capital could already point in different directions for the treatment and control groups before the hurricane. Therefore, we rely on a difference-indifference estimation that compares the ratio of the total risk-based capital after treatment both to the treatment group before treatment and to the control group.
Baseline estimation
In applying a difference-in-difference estimation technique, we estimate whether higher capital ratios are systematic and can be attributed to the hurricane. Formally, we estimate the following equation:
The dependent variable CAP it is the total risk-based capital ratio of bank i at time t. , 1997) . Note that these control variables only matter for the estimation to the degree that they are time variant because they are otherwise already included in the bank fixed effects. As an additional time-varying control variable that captures differences in local economic developments, we use quarterly unemployment rates at the county level.
The effect of increased asset risk on risk-based capital ratios
We begin by presenting the main estimation results and then describe several further estimation results to expand and corroborate those results.
Main estimation results
We present our main results in Table 2 . Column 1 shows the difference-in-difference estimation without bank fixed effects. With regard to our main variable of interest, the interaction term Event t *Affected i , we observe a positive and significant coefficient that shows that affected banks increase their capital ratios after the hurricane. This effect is also highly significant economically. Affected banks have a total risk-based capital ratio that is on average 1.2 percentage points higher than the ratio of unaffected banks after the hurricane, as shown by the point estimate of the interaction term.
Next, column 2 shows results for our baseline estimation with bank fixed effects [Eq. (3)].
Importantly, the results remain robust and confirm that a change in the risk environment of a bank is highly relevant. The average effect of the hurricane on affected banks' total risk-based capital ratios of 1.1 percentage points is slightly lower but still is in the same range as before. Note that bank fixed effects explain a lot of the variation in total risk-based capital ratios (note the adjusted R 2 increases from 0.3% to 85%). This suggests that unobserved time-invariant bank-specific factors are also important.
Last, we add bank characteristics that are regarded as relevant for banks' capital ratios and the unemployment rate at the county level. We find that size approximated by employees adds some explanation to our regression but bank profitability and non-performing loans are not significant. In addition, we find that banks that operate in counties with higher unemployment have higher total risk-based capital ratios. But foremost, adding other covariates leaves the effect of the interaction term intact. 11
[ Table 2 ]
This first set of results strongly advocates that independent banks react when confronted with a shock that increases the economic risk in their business region. They do this by increasing their (regulatory) risk-based capital ratio relative to banks that do not experience this shock.
In other words, the results suggest that banks strengthen their bank-specific cushion against insolvency, and they are not reacting purely to regulatory capital requirements. This finding adds to Flannery and Rangan (2008) who suggest that a change in the banking environment rather than supervisory pressure leads to higher capital ratios for U.S. banks during the 1990s.
Moreover, we are in line with Gropp and Heider (2010) who argue that banks rely on "own 11 In unreported results we find the same effect when we consider Tier 1 risk-based capital ratios instead of Total risk-based capital ratios. judgement" to define the appropriate amount of total risk-based capital and that regulatory requirements are of second-order importance.
Alternative time horizons
In the previous subsection, we established our main results for the period of ± 2 years around the event. Next, we investigate whether this effect differs for alternative time horizons around the event. Therefore, Table 3 shows results for the fixed-effects estimation of Eq. (3) for the periods of 4, 6, 8 and 10 quarters around the hurricane.
We find that the effect on banks' total risk-based capital ratios for the shortest period is also positive but becomes less statistically significant. This finding suggests that banks require some time to adjust to the new risk environment and to build up their total risk-based capital ratios. For periods of six quarters or longer, the effect stays significant at the 5% level and is also economically significant with a value around 1 percentage point. Furthermore, we also find that the statistical significance maintains for the longest period of ± 10 quarters. This finding might be interpreted as the uncertainty about borrower quality and credit risks with the economic prospects of the region might not have diminished more than two years after the hurricane.
[ Table 3 ]
Alternative regional samples
This subsection examines whether a smaller or larger sample of the states that we consider for the composition of the control and the treatment groups might change our main results. Recall that our previous results are based on a sample with 99 affected banks and 178 unaffected banks in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma. For the robustness check in this section, we make the following changes: First, we restrict the sample to banks that operate in Florida and Alabama only. The reason is that only these states comprise both counties affected and counties unaffected by the hurricane. Second, we restrict the sample to counties in the core states affected by the hurricane (Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Florida, and Alabama) and thus exclude banks in neighbor states (Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Oklahoma) from the control group relative to our baseline sample. Third, we extend the sample to banks in neighboring U.S. Southeast states, that is, South Carolina and North Carolina, and thus add banks from these states to the control group.
We rerun our main regression and provide results for our baseline sample and the three alternative regional samples in Table 4 . Across all groups we find significant results for the treatment effect from Hurricane Katrina on the total risk-based capital ratio of affected banks.
We also find that the effect is economically stronger for the core regions. Here, affected banks increase their total risk-based capital ratio by nearly 2.1 percentage points relative to their unaffected peers after the event. Considering the largest sample in the last column, we find very similar results to our baseline regression in Table 2 . Overall, Table 4 shows that our results do not hinge on the choice of a specific control group.
[ Table 4 ]
Potential credit demand effects
Because we are interested in bank behavior, we have to rule out that the results mainly reflect a shortfall in credit demand after the hurricane, which technically would also lead to higher regulatory capital ratios for banks in affected areas. 12 To mitigate such concerns, we explore the development of gross loans and different types of loans in counties affected and unaffected by Hurricane Katrina. In particular, we consolidate data for all gross loans, commercial & industrial loans, real estate loans, commercial real estate loans, consumer loans, and total assets by quarter and by county comprising both data for independent and BHC banks. Table 5 shows regression results for the collapsed sample for different loan categories (all standardized by total assets) in columns 1 to 5. The regressions comprise all counties for 12 Remember that a bank's total risk-based capital ratio is calculated as its total Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over its risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets often substantially reflect consumer, commercial & industrial loans. the baseline sample for the period of ± 8 quarter around the event. Importantly, we do not observe a significant effect for the ratio of total gross loans or the various loan categories.
Moreover, we investigate the total risk-based capital ratio for BHC banks around Hurricane Katrina. If demand effects are relevant, we should detect an effect on the total risk-based capital ratio for BHC banks, too. As shown in the last column of Table 5 , we do not find a significant effect from the hurricane on the total risk-based capital ratio of affected BHC banks relative to their non-affected BHC peers. Thus, we are confident that our results are not driven by demand effects.
[ Table 5 Thus, it is highly unlikely that a shortfall in credit demand is driving the results during the two-year period that we examine.
Additional robustness tests

Parallel-trend assumption
To alleviate potential biases we have to guarantee that the parallel-trend assumption prior to the treatment is satisfied. In other words, the total risk-based capital ratios should follow a similar trend for the treatment and control groups. Analogous to previous studies, in Fig. 2 we graphically inspect the trend of mean total risk-based capital for both groups and confirm the parallel-trend assumption. Further, as already discussed in Subsection 2.4 and shown in Table 1 , the groups of affected and unaffected banks largely do not differ significantly with respect to common bank characteristics.
Cross-section estimation
In order to show that the results are robust against problems with difference-in-difference technique in the presence of serial correlation, Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest ignoring the time structure of the data. Therefore, we average the data before and after the hurricane and rerun the estimation for this collapsed sample. Table 6 presents results for the collapsed baseline sample over the four different time periods.
We find the treatment effect for all different periods intact and in the range of about 1 to 1.5 percentage points. As opposed to the panel results presented so far, the adjusted R 2 is much lower. When we rerun the estimation for alternative regional samples, as discussed in Subsection 4.3, we again find that the effect of the hurricane on affected banks' total risk-based capital ratio is significant and positive (not reported).
[ Table 6 ]
Time-placebo estimation
The possibility that the results are driven by time trends unrelated to Hurricane Katrina needs to be ruled out. Therefore, we run a "placebo estimation" where the treatment shifts from the Q3 and Q4 of 2005 to Q3 and Q4 of 2002. We then rerun the estimation for observations two years before and after this "2002 pseudo hurricane" event. Table 7 shows the results for this analysis, which can be directly compared to our baseline results in Table 2 . We do not find an effect for the 2002 pseudo hurricane in any of our baseline specifications. This finding supports our assumption that our results are not driven by factors unrelated to Hurricane Katrina.
[ Table 7 ]
Behavior of low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks
Theory suggests that bank characteristics such as bankruptcy costs, franchise value, value of deposit guarantees, and bank governance are important determinants for banks' risk taking. Accordingly, banks can choose to be more risky or more safe that is approximately reflected in lower and higher capital ratios. Therefore, we examine subsamples of low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks separately.
Subsample characteristics
In order to construct these subsamples, we first calculate the average total risk-based capital ratio for each bank during the eight quarters pre- Katrina (Q3 2003 Katrina (Q3 to Q2 2005 . We then calculate the corresponding median value of all banks, which is a total risk-based capital ratio of 15.8%. Next, we classify all banks with an average below the median as low-capitalized and all other banks as high-capitalized. Note that even in the low-capitalized subsample, more than 95% of the banks held an average total risk-based capital ratio pre-Katrina above 10%, which is well above the required 8% and considered as "well capitalized" by the FDIC. 13
When we compare banks that are high-capitalized and low-capitalized we have to be careful that within both subsamples affected and unaffected banks have similar characteristics before the hurricane. Therefore, Table 8 presents mean values and standard deviations for the same bank characteristics and regional control variables explained in Table 1 . Again, normalized differences check whether these characteristics differ significantly between affected and unaffected banks in both subsamples.
Considering high-capitalized banks on the left side of the table there are no significant differences along all characteristics. If we further consider the sample of low capitalized banks, we exclude the six largest low-capitalized banks from the subsample to guarantee similar characteristics of affected and unaffected banks. Otherwise, we find that affected banks and unaffected banks differ across several bank characteristics. Nevertheless, the following regres-sion results hold whether this adjustment is made or not. In the sample of low-capitalized banks some differences are more pronounced but are not overall significant according to normalized differences. In particular, low-capitalized unaffected banks hold slightly higher shares of total loans that are mirrored in the higher ratio of risk-weighted assets also. Overall, normalized differences confirm that the split in high-and low-capitalized banks does not produce very different samples.
When we consider the immediate impact of Hurricane Katrina, we expect that affected banks in both subsamples faced an uncertain economic environment and higher asset risks after 2005 as noted by the FDIC and rating agencies. However, accounting figures only reflect significantly higher loan loss provisions for the subsample of affected high-capitalized banks.
One possible explanation is different accounting practices and use of regulatory forbearance after the hurricane. Nevertheless, we are cautious about the interpretation of results for the subsample of low-capitalized banks and focus on the behavior of high-capitalized banks.
[ Table 8 ]
Estimation results
Along the sample split of low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks, we reestimate our baseline regression for both groups separately. Table 9 shows values for the interaction term β 3 , its standard errors and the overall fit for each regression based on four alternative time horizons from ±4 to ±10 quarters around the hurricane (equivalent to Subsection 4.2) and four alternative regional samples (equivalent to Subsection 4.3). 14 We observe that banks in our high-capitalized subsample significantly modify their capital ratios upward which is in line with the results for the whole sample. This result holds over all regions and time periods. Considering the baseline regression (± 8 quarters), we find an economic effect of around 1.75 percentage points triggered by the hurricane event. For the other specifications, the effect ranges from 1.32 percentage points to 4.10 percentage points. To the contrary and consistently over all periods and control regions, low-capitalized banks do not significantly alter their total risk-based capital ratios.
14 Full information tables can be provided upon request.
[ Table 9 ]
The analysis yields an interesting result about how banks react to increased asset risks. Banks that ex ante choose to be relatively conservative (the high-capitalized subsample) take higher risks into account for their capital ratio adjustments. They seem to be driven by the motive to avoid bankruptcy under all circumstances. Banks that ex ante choose to be more risky (the low-capitalized subsample) do not adjust their capital ratios.
Robustness
We run several robustness checks along the analyses in the previous subsection for the subsample of high-capitalized and low-capitalized banks (not reported). In particular, we find that if we consider a regression without bank fixed effects and a regression in which we add further covariates as in Table 2 (column 3), the results in Table 9 remain intact. We also find that high-capitalized banks increase their total risk-based capital ratios relative to their unaffected peers after the event in cross-section regressions for all regions and time periods.
Mechanisms of capital ratio adjustments
This section examines the mechanisms that are responsible for the capital-ratio adjustments of banks.
The role of capital level and risk-weighted assets
Banks can adjust their capital ratios in two ways. First, they can adjust their capital level (the numerator of the ratio), for example, by raising new capital or by increasing the share of retained earnings. Second, banks can cut back their risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the ratio), for example, by restricting the provision of new loans. Therefore, we are interested in whether banks adjust their total capital, their risk-weighted assets, or both.
Building on the results from the previous section that high-capitalized and low-capitalized banks behave differently, we continue to examine these groups separately in this subsection.
We do not expect that low-capitalized banks significantly adjust their capital or risk-weighted assets, but we include both groups in our analysis to get a better understanding of the full picture.
The analysis starts with focusing on the numerator of banks' total risk-based capital ratio, and therefore uses total tier capital over assets as the dependent variable. We rerun the baseline regression for high-capitalized and low-capitalized banks for the four different time horizons previously reported. We find no significant effects for banks in either the low-capitalized group or the high-capitalized group, as shown in Table 10 . In unreported regressions we also check whether we find an effect on dividends or retained earnings after the hurricane. Again, we do not find any significant effect for either high-capitalized or low-capitalized affected banks.
[ Table 10 ] Next, we use risk-weighted assets over assets as the dependent variable and rerun our baseline regression. As Table 10 shows, we find that affected banks of the high-capitalized group decrease their risk-weighted assets significantly in the aftermath of the hurricane. This effect is significant and economically very strong for the shortest time period, but it loses some strength for longer observation periods. Ten quarters after the event, the effect for the high-capitalized affected banks remains significant. These results corroborate our previous findings from Section 5 that high-capitalized banks significantly increase their total risk-based capital ratios and show that they do this by decreasing their risk-weighted assets, and not by increasing their level of capital. These findings are in line with Thakor (1996) who suggests that banks typically face high costs in raising equity. To meet the capital requirement, which might well exceed the minimum requirement, a bank can constrain further lending. Instead of extending lending activity a bank is likely to invest in marketable securities.
Results are also in line with our previous result that low-capitalized banks do not adjust their capital ratios. In particular, we do not find a significant effect on the risk-weighted assets of affected low-capitalized banks, as Table 10 also shows.
Bank lending
We further investigate whether a reduction of risk-weighted assets is associated with a reduction in lending. To investigate this issue, we first use banks' gross loans over assets as the dependent variable. As Table 10 shows, we find that high-capitalized affected banks decrease loan business in the aftermath of the hurricane while results for low-capitalized banks are not significant. The reduction of loans takes place within an equal time horizon and becomes less significant for the longest period, ± 10 quarters around the event. These results suggest that high-capitalized affected banks become more stable in terms of their total risk-based capital ratio after the event by reducing their loan supply. This finding is in line with Garmaise and Moskowitz (2009) who show that, in the context of earthquake risk, local banks are reluctant to offer loans to high earthquake-risk properties in the period after the 1994 Northridge earthquake.
Next, we explore several other balance sheet figures that are related to a bank's risk-weighted assets. Interestingly, we find that high-capitalized affected banks increase their investments in risk-free U.S. government securities post Hurricane Katrina, as the last columns of Table   10 indicate. Economically this effect is very similar to the reduction in loans to assets but is positive, and thereby roughly offsets the loan reduction. A reduction in risk weights is obviously driven by a decline in loan supply accompanied by investments in government securities. Again, there is no such effect for low-capitalized banks.
These results are also meaningful as regards potential concerns that the observed reduction of risk-weighted assets is demand driven, as already discussed in Subsection 4.4. Note that a shortfall in demand is also present for low-capitalized banks that operate in the hurricane regions. As shown in this subsection, we find no such significant effect for low-capitalized affected banks. Thus, this finding further strengthens the interpretation that our results reflect the behavior of banks and not the economic conditions in the hurricane regions.
Commercial & industrial, real estate and consumer loans
This set of regressions further investigates whether the overall reduction of loans by highcapitalized affected banks is consistent over different loan types. Therefore, Table 11 provides results for the baseline regression that uses banks' commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans, commercial real estate loans and consumer loans as the dependent variable. We find that the overall loan reduction of high-capitalized affected banks after the event stems from less engagement in corporate and mortgage lending. Here the effect is negative and significant for the shorter two periods around the event whereas we do not find an effect for the subsample of low-capitalized banks. We also do not find an effect for commercial real estate loans and consumer loans for both groups.
To conclude, high-capitalized banks that were affected by the Hurricane Katrina did not significantly adjust their capital levels. However, they reacted to the higher asset risks by shifting investments from risky loans to risk-free U.S. government securities and thereby increased their capital ratios. We find that these effects are significant and economically relevant over different periods around the events. Further our results even hold when we consider different loan types. Here, banks reduced risky assets in the form of mortgage and corporate lending in the phase after Hurricane Katrina.
[ Table 11 ]
Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical assessment of the impact of bank asset risks on capital ratios using a natural experiment. Therefore, we examine the effects of Hurricane Katrina that exposed banks in the U.S. Gulf Coast region to unexpected losses and increased credit risks in August 2005. This examination allows us to identify a causal relation between asset risk and capital ratios that is otherwise difficult because of mutual influences and feedback effects. A better understanding of this relation is important because capital ratios are a key factor in banking regulation.
We find that a shock that increases banks' credit risk, measured as the impact of Hurricane Katrina, induces affected banks to increase their capital ratios relative to the banks in the control group (not affected by the hurricane). Affected banks thereby strengthen their buffer against future income shocks and mitigate bankruptcy risks. This strengthening shows that asset risk is an important determinant of bank capital ratios besides any regulatory requirements.
However, when we examine low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks separately, we only find a significant effect for high-capitalized banks. This effect demonstrates that the risk-taking behavior of banks cannot be generalized for all banks but depends on bank characteristics.
Based on existing research, relevant bank characteristics could be a bank's franchise value, its bankruptcy costs, and/or the value of its deposit guarantees.
Furthermore, we find that the high-capitalized banks that increase their capital ratios do this by reducing their risk-weighted assets and not by increasing their capital levels. In particular, these banks shift their investments from risky loans to risk-free U.S. government securities.
This shift has ambiguous effects for the economy: Banks become more stable, which has positive effects, but firms might suffer from a lower supply of credit. We provide mean values and standard deviations for independent banks (i.e., they do not belong to a BHC) that belong to counties that were affected by the hurricane (affected), banks operating in counties unaffected by the event (unaffected), and also for affected banks that belong to a BHC. The sample consists of 99 affected and 178 unaffected independent banks and 222 affected BHC banks. The sample includes all banks in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma. The last two columns show the normalized differences (Norm. Diff.) according to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and compare differences between independent banks that were affected versus banks that were not affected ( (1) vs (2)) and affected independent banks with affected BHC banks ( (1) vs (3)). As a rule of thumb, values between ± 0.25 are equivalent to nonsignificant differences between groups. Variables are defined as follows: Total risk-based capital ratio represents banks' total risk-based capital to its risk-weighted assets; Risk-weighted assets/Assets is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets; Tier capital/Assets relates the sum of a bank's Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to total assets; Risk-weighted assets represent the dollar amount of banks' risk-weighted assets; Total Tier capital is the dollar amount of the sum of banks' Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital; Total assets are banks' total assets; Total loans/Assets is the ratio of banks' total (gross) loans to total assets; C&I loans/Assets is the ratio of banks' corporate and industrial loans to total assets; Real estate loans/Assets is the ratio of banks' mortgage loans to total assets; Commercial RE loans/Assets is the ratio of banks' nonresidential loans secured by real estate to total assets; Consumer loans/Assets is the ratio of consumer loans to total assets; U.S. Gov. securities/Assets is the ratio of banks' U.S. government securities to total assets; RoA is banks' return over assets; Non-perf. loans/Assets shows the ratio of total assets past due 90 or more days and still accruing interest to banks' total assets; Provisions for loans/Loans is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; No. of employees is the number of full-time employees on the payroll of the bank and its subsidiaries at the end of the quarter; Share of commercial banks is a dummy variable that equals one for commercial banks and zero otherwise; Share of stock institutions is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is a stock institution or zero otherwise; Regional unemployment rate shows the unemployment rate per county per quarter. The U.S. $ values are denoted in millions. Furthermore, a very detailed description of all variables with FDIC codes is given in in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma that are independent, i.e., do not belong to a BHC. Event is a dummy variable that is zero for the pre-hurricane period and one after the event.
Affected is a dummy variable that separates banks in counties that were affected by the hurricane and has a value of one and those that were unaffected have a value of zero. Event*Affected is an interaction term for the variables Event and Affected. RoA is banks' return on assets. Non-perf. loans/Assets shows the ratio of total assets past due 90 or more days and still accruing interest to banks' total assets, and Log (No. of employees) is the natural logarithm of banks' number of employees. Regional unemployment rate represents the quarterly unemployment rate for each quarter. A very detailed description of all variables with FDIC codes is given in Table 12 . We also include bank fixed effects (Bank FE) and year dummies (Time FE) in the regressions. We show clustered standard errors on bank level in parentheses. The ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. (3) in which banks' total risk-based capital ratio is the dependent variable. The sample includes all banks in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma that are independent, i.e., do not belong to a BHC. Event is a dummy variable that is zero for the prehurricane period and one after the event. Affected is a dummy variable that separates banks in counties that were affected by the hurricane and has a value of one and those that were unaffected have a value of zero. Event*Affected is an interaction term for the variables Event and Affected. Regressions presented in this table are for the periods of ± 4, 6, 8, and 10 quarters around the event. We include bank fixed effects (Bank FE) and year dummies (Time FE) in each regression. We show clustered standard errors on bank level in parentheses. The ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Total risk-based capital ratio
Total risk-based capital ratio ± 4 quarter ± 6 quarter ± 8 quarter ± 10 quarter Event -0.0066*** -0.0107*** -0.0103*** -0.0156** Event is a dummy variable that is zero for the pre-hurricane period and one after the event. Affected is a dummy variable that separates banks in counties that were affected by the hurricane and has a value of one and those that were unaffected have a value of zero. Event*Affected is a interaction term for the variables Event and affected. We consider the period of ± 8 quarters around the event.
We also include bank fixed effects (Bank FE), county fixed effects (County FE) and year dummies (Time FE) in the regressions. We show clustered standard errors on bank level in parentheses. The ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All Banks ( Arkansas and Oklahoma that are independent, i.e., do not belong to a BHC. Event is a dummy variable that is zero for the pre-hurricane period and one after the event. Affected is a dummy variable that separates banks in counties that were affected by the hurricane and has a value of one and those that were unaffected have a value of zero. Event*Affected is a interaction term for the variables Event and affected. Cross-sections for each time period (i.e., for the period of ± 4, 6, 8, and 10 quarters around the event) comprise collapsed mean values for each bank before and after the event for each period respectively. We show clustered standard errors on bank level in parentheses. The ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Total risk-based capital ratio ± 4 quarter ± 6 quarter ± 8 quarter ± 10 quarter Event -0.0058** -0.0092*** -0.0098*** -0.0119** This table shows descriptive statistics for low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks. The Total risk-based capital ratio of low-capitalized banks is below the sample median before the hurricane event. The Total risk-based capital ratio of high-capitalized banks is above the median before the hurricane event. We provide mean values and standard deviations for independent banks (i.e., they do not belong to a BHC) that belong to counties that were affected by the hurricanes (affected) and banks operating in counties unaffected by the event (unaffected). ND is a short hand and shows normalized differences according to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) that compares differences between affected and unaffected banks for high-capitalized ((1) vs (2)) or low-capitalized ((1) vs (3)). As a rule of thumb, values around ± 0.25 relate to nonsignificant differences between groups. Variables are defined as in with FDIC codes is given in Table 12 .
High-capitalized banks Low-capitalized banks affected (1) unaffected (2) Norm. Diff.
affected (3) unaffected (4) Norm. Diff. Table 4 . We only show results for the interaction term (Event*Affected) β 3 for each regression (full information can be obtained upon request). The top panel of this table includes banks that are high-capitalized banks, i.e., their level of total risk-based capital ratios is above the sample median before the hurricane event. The lower panel comprises all banks that show ratios below the median before the hurricane event. All variables are defined as in Table 2 . We include bank fixed effects (Bank FE) and year dummies (Time FE) in each regression. We show clustered standard errors on bank level in parentheses. The ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. This table shows results for regressions of Eq. (3) in which banks' ratio of C&I loans to assets, the ratio of banks' real-estate loans to total assets, the ratio of commercial real estate loans to totla assets, and the ratio of total consumer loans to total assets are the dependent variables. Regressions presented in this table are for the periods ± 4, 6, 8, and 10 quarters around the event. We only show results for the interaction term (Event*Affected) β 3 for each regression (full information can be obtained upon request). The sample includes all banks in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Oklahoma that are independent, i.e., do not belong to a BHC. We include bank fixed effects (Bank FE) and year dummies (Time FE) in each regression. We show clustered standard errors on bank level in parentheses. The ***, ** and * stand for significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Mean
High
